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INTRODUCTION 
The rule of privity of contract means that only the parties to 
a contract have enforceable rights and obligations under the 
contract. A third party to the contract cannot enforce any of its 
terms nor have any burdens from that contract enforced on them. 
The latter aspect of the doctrine is relatively uncontroversial,1 but 
the former has throughout its development provoked much 
criticism and debate.2  
In Ireland, specific difficulties caused by the privity rule 
have been dealt with up until now by piecemeal legislative and 
judicial reforms. However, in 2008 the Law Reform Commission 
recommended a general reform of the doctrine of privity of 
contract, to allow third parties to enforce contracts which were 
made for their benefit.3 In its Report on Privity of Contract and 
Third Party Rights, the Commission outlined a detailed legislative 
scheme of third party rights, and a draft Contract Law (Privity of 
_____________________________________________________ 
* B.C.L., PhD (NUI), Lecturer, Faculty of Law, NUI Galway. The author was 
the principal legal researcher for the Law Reform Commission Report on 
Privity of Contract and Third Party Rights (LRC 88 – 2008). However, the 
views expressed here do not represent those of the Law Reform Commission. 
1 Exceptions to this rule do exist, however. For example, the rule in Tulk v. 
Moxhay (1848) 2 Ph. 774 provides that a negative covenant relating to land can 
in certain circumstances be enforced against subsequent owners of the land. 
Section 47 of the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Bill, 2006, which is 
currently before the Oireachtas, proposes to make freehold covenants (positive 
and negative) fully enforceable by and against successors in title.  
2 For the history and development of the doctrine of privity of contract, see 
Flannigan, “Privity of contract – the end of an era (error)”, (1987) 103 L.Q.R. 
564.  
3 Law Reform Commission, Report on Privity of Contract and Third Party 
Rights (L.R.C. 88 – 2008), hereafter “Report” or “Commission Report”. The 
Report forms part of the Commission’s Second Programme of Law Reform 
2000 – 2007, and follows the publication in 2006 of a Consultation Paper 
Privity of Contract: Third Party Rights (L.R.C. CP 40 – 2006). The Report and 
Consultation Paper are both available at: www.lawreform.ie.  
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Contract and Third Party Rights) Bill was included in an 
Appendix to the Report. Similar reforms have occurred in other 
common law jurisdictions, either by means of legislation, such as 
the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999 in England and 
Wales, or as a result of judicial reform, as in Canada. This article 
will outline and analyse the arguments in favour of reform and the 
legislative scheme proposed by the Commission.  
 
 
I. THE CURRENT LAW IN IRELAND 
In Ireland, it is a general principle of contract law that a 
third party to a contract cannot enforce the contract, or a term of 
the contract, even if it was intended to benefit them. For example, 
A might promise his father, B, that in return for the family farm, 
A will pay a sum of money to his sister, C. If A fails to pay the 
money, the privity rule prevents C from suing A to enforce this 
contract.4  
There are many exceptions to the privity rule, both at 
common law and in the statute book.5 They developed in an ad 
hoc fashion as a response to specific situations where the courts 
or the legislature ascertained a need to grant third parties the right 
to enforce a contract made for their benefit. One of the most 
important of these exceptions is agency, which allows a principal 
to sue and be sued on a contract entered into by their agent on 
their behalf. The law of trusts provides another potential means of 
enforcement: a third party can enforce a contract if a completely 
constituted trust was created in their favour by the contract.  
In some earlier cases the courts were willing to imply the 
existence of a trust to give rights to third parties,6 but this has 
been criticised as a “cumbrous fiction”,7 and today courts are 
reluctant to find that there is a trust unless it is clear that this was 
_____________________________________________________ 
4 See Report, para. 1.07, Example 2. See also McCoubray v. Thompson (1868) 
2 I.R.C.L. 226; Cadbury (Ireland) Ltd v. Kerry Co-Operative Creameries Ltd 
[1982] I.L.R.M. 77.  
5 See Report, paras. 1.10 – 1.61.  
6 See for example Drimmie v. Davies (1899) 1 I.R. 176; Kelly v. Larkin [1910] 
2 I.R. 550. 
7 Lord Wright (1939) 55 L.Q.R. 189, 208.  
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the intention of the parties.8 Specific statutory exceptions to the 
rule include section 8 of the Married Women’s Status Act, 1957, 
which provides that any contract entered into by a person that 
confers a benefit on their spouse or their children can be enforced 
by the spouse or children,9 and section 80 of the Consumer Credit 
Act, 1995, which provides that where a consumer enters into a 
hire purchase agreement, the consumer has a remedy against both 
the seller and the hire purchase company in the event of a breach 
of the agreement or a misrepresentation by either the seller or the 
hire purchase company.10  
The rule of privity of contract is also circumvented in 
practice by means of devices such as assignment11 and collateral 
warranties. This is particularly the case with large-scale projects 
in the construction industry, where chains of assignment and 
collateral warranties are often used to ensure that all the parties 
involved in the project (contractors, subcontractors, engineers, 
architects, etc.) are contractually bound to each other in some 
way. For example, the rule of privity means that a sub-contractor 
is not liable in contract to a principal employer, as its contract is 
with the contractor and not the employer, but a collateral warranty 
could be entered into to ensure that the sub-contractor is so liable.  
 
 
II. THE NEED TO REFORM THE PRIVITY RULE 
In its Report, the Law Reform Commission identified a 
significant number of difficulties with the privity rule.12 Perhaps 
the most important of these is the fact that, as the law currently 
stands, a third party cannot enforce a contract made for their 
benefit even if the contracting parties agreed that they should be 
able to do so. Thus, the privity rule “can thwart the intentions of 
_____________________________________________________ 
8 See for example Cadbury (Ireland) Ltd v. Kerry Co-op Creameries Ltd 
[1982] I.L.R.M. 77.  
9 The contract must expressly confer a benefit on the spouse or child: Burke v. 
Dublin Corporation [1991] 1 I.R. 341.  
10 See also s. 14 of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act, 1980.  
11 See s. 28(6) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Ireland) Act, 1877, which 
provides that an “absolute assignment” by the assignor of any debt or other 
legal chose in action can pass the legal right to the debt or chose in action to 
the assignee.  
12 See Report, paras. 2.02 – 2.66.  
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the contracting parties”13 and run counter to the basic principle of 
freedom of contract. Lord Steyn has summarised this criticism of 
the privity rule as follows: 
 
The case for recognising a contract for the benefit of a third 
party is simple and straightforward. The autonomy of the 
will of the parties should be respected. The law of contract 
should give effect to the reasonable expectations of 
contracting parties ... [T]here is no doctrinal, logical or 
policy reason why the law should deny effectiveness to a 
contract for the benefit of a third party where that is the 
expressed intention of the parties ... It is, therefore, unjust to 
deny effectiveness to such a contract.14 
 
This argument is not without its critics. It has been argued that 
only the intentions of the promisee, and not the intentions of both 
contracting parties, are thwarted by the privity rule, because if the 
original promisor “wishes to comply with his original promise all 
he needs to do is keep it”.15 However, generally in any 
contractual analysis it is the intention of the contracting parties at 
the time of contracting which is important, and not their intention 
when performance is due.  
_____________________________________________________ 
Second, it has been argued that although the third party 
cannot sue the promisor for breach of contract, the promisee can 
always sue to enforce the contract, and this should suffice to give 
effect to the parties’ intentions.16 However, if the promisee has 
not suffered a loss they may only recover nominal damages, 
because as a general rule it is not possible for the promisee to 
recover damages in contract for the loss suffered by a third 
party.17 There are exceptions to this rule, in particular The 
Albazero exception,18 which arises when “loss is suffered in 
13 Report, para. 2.03.  
14 Darlington Borough Council v. Wiltshier Northern Ltd [1995] 1 W.L.R. 68, 
at 76.  
15 Stevens, “The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999”, (2004) 120 
L.Q.R. 292, p. 293.  
16 Stevens, “The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999”, (2004) 120 
L.Q.R. 292, p. 293.  
17 See Report, paras. 1.63 – 1.68 and paras. 2.74 – 2.79.  
18 The Albazero [1977] A.C. 774.  
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consequence of breach of contract, but the contract-breaker’s 
position is that no-one is legally entitled to recover substantial 
damages from him”.19 In this situation, the contracting party may 
be able to claim damages to represent the loss of a third party 
because otherwise the claim for damages falls into a “legal black 
hole”. It is also possible that a court will give a broad 
interpretation to the loss suffered by the promisee, for example, 
by awarding damages to protect the promisee’s “performance 
interest”, i.e., his interest in the provision of a benefit to the third 
party, or by awarding damages to compensate for the promisee’s 
disappointment or inconvenience.20 Such a broad measure of 
damages may be easier to obtain where the contract is a consumer 
transaction.21 It may also be possible to the promisee to obtain an 
order of specific performance to compel the promisor to perform 
their end of the bargain.22 However, the circumstances in which it 
is possible to recover damages to represent the loss suffered by a 
third party are limited and uncertain, and an order of specific 
performance will not always be available.23  
Even if the promisee can obtain substantial damages, the 
ability of the promisee to sue to enforce the contract would only 
assist third parties where the promisee (or, in the event of their 
death, their legal representative) is willing and able to bring such 
an action. It has been pointed out that “the stress and strain of 
litigation and its cost will deter many promisees who might 
fervently want their contract enforced for the benefit of third 
parties”.24 Furthermore, the ability of the promisee to sue would 
_____________________________________________________ 
19 Technotrade Ltd v. Larkstore Ltd [2006] E.W.C.A. Civ. 1079, para. 3 per 
Mummery J. The reference to damages is to damages in contract, and not in 
tort: see Chia Kok Leong v. Prosperland Pte Ltd [2005] 2 S.L.R. 484 
(Singapore Court of Appeal).  
20 See Clark, Contract Law in Ireland, 5th ed. (Dublin: Thomson Round Hall, 
2004), pp. 565 – 569. 
21 See Burke v. Dublin Corporation [1991] 1 I.R. 341, at 353 where Finlay C.J. 
said that such cases may call for “special treatment” in relation to the measure 
of damages.  
22 See for example Beswick v. Beswick [1968] A.C. 58.  
23 See generally Delany, Equity and the Law of Trusts in Ireland 4th ed., 
(Dublin: Round Hall, 2007), ch. 14.  
24 Law Commission for England and Wales, Privity of contract: Contracts for 
the Benefit of Third Parties (Law Com. No. 242, 1996), at para. 3.4. 
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be of little use to someone who is seeking to rely on an exemption 
clause contained in a contract to which they are not party.25 Nor 
would the award of damages to a promisee be much consolation 
to a third party unless the third party could claim the sum 
awarded. If damages are awarded for the “use and benefit” of the 
third party, then the third party may be able to claim the sum, but 
if damages are merely awarded for the contracting party’s 
personal disappointment that the contract was not performed the 
third party may not be able to claim the sum.  
More fundamentally, however, when the contracting parties 
intend to give a right of enforcement to a third party, it is difficult 
to see how it can be said that effect is given to that intention by 
allowing the promisee, but not the third party, to sue. It would 
surely be much simpler and clearer to give effect to the intentions 
of the contracting parties by allowing the third party to enforce 
the contract.  
Another argument in favour of retaining the status quo is 
that contracting parties who wish to benefit a third party can 
always make use of one of the many exceptions to the rule, and 
that devices such as assignment and collateral warranties are 
frequently used to circumvent the privity rule. It could thus be 
said that privity does not cause real difficulties in practice. 
However, there a number of difficulties with this argument.  
First, the current exceptions do not cover every situation 
where an unjust or illogical result is caused by the privity rule. 
For example, section 7 of the Married Women’s Status Act, 1957 
provides that a policy of life assurance which is expressed to be 
for the benefit of a spouse or child of the insured is enforceable 
by that spouse or child, but this section does not apply to other 
relatives or cohabitants under a contract of insurance.26  
_____________________________________________________ 
25 This is discussed in more detail below.  
26 Third parties who do not fall under the legislative exception would have to 
show that they come under an exception to the privity rule, for example by 
showing that a completely constituted trust was formed in their favour. 
However, in Vandepitte v. Preferred Accident Insurance Corp of New York 
[1933] A.C. 70, at 79-80 Lord Wright stated that “the intention to constitute the 
trust must be affirmatively proved: the intention cannot necessarily be inferred 
from the mere general words of the policy”. 
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Second, it is often unclear whether or not the courts will 
apply the privity rule or an exception to the rule, and there is 
always the possibility that the courts may, in an appropriate case, 
carve out a new exception to the rule – perhaps if not by outright 
reform,27 then by developing existing exceptions or concepts.  
It must be said that the idea of a judicial development of the 
privity rule has its supporters, who suggest that “justice … may in 
any event be achieved” by making use of devices such as 
constructive trusts or estoppel to allow a third party to bring an 
action in a suitable case.28 Although it cannot be denied that in a 
suitable case these devices may bring about a desirable result (at 
least from the point of the third party), in this author’s view such 
developments would only add to the complexity of this area of 
law, and cause further uncertainty.29 Mason C.J. in the Australian 
High Court has commented that the rights of third parties “should 
not be made to depend on the vagaries of such an intricate 
doctrine” as estoppel, and has said that it is doubtful whether 
estoppel would provide “an adequate protection of the legitimate 
expectations of [third parties]”.30 Perhaps the real advantage of 
any such judicial development would be that it could act as a spur 
for legislative reforms. 
The argument that the contracting parties can use a legal 
technique such as assignment to avoid the effects of the rule 
assumes that the parties are aware of the rule and its effects. 
However, many contracting parties may simply assume that a 
third party can sue to enforce a contract made for their benefit, 
and many third parties (for example, the recipient of a gift from a 
friend) may assume that they have enforceable rights under the 
main contract. Even if the contracting parties are aware of the 
existence of the rule, they are likely to need legal advice in 
relation to it, in particular to ascertain whether or not one of the 
_____________________________________________________ 
27 As was arguably the case, for example, in Canada – see Fraser River Pile & 
Dredge Ltd v. Can Dive Services Ltd [1999] 3 S.C.R. 108. 
28 Byrne and Binchy, Annual Review of Irish Law 2006 (Dublin: Round Hall 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2007), p. 430.  
29 See also the Report, paras. 2.68 – 2.73, where the Commission recommends 
that legislative reform of the privity rule is more appropriate than judicial 
reform.  
30 Trident General Insurance Co v. McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 165 C.L.R. 
107.  
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many exceptions to the rule applies. Obtaining such advice is both 
inconvenient and expensive. Nor is there any guarantee that such 
advice will be conclusive – as discussed above, it can be unclear 
when the courts will apply the privity rule or an exception to the 
rule. Finally, if it is concluded that the privity rule applies, 
additional expense and inconvenience may be incurred in 
restructuring the transaction to avoid the effects of the rule. One 
commentator, carrying out an economic analysis of the rule, has 
stated: “[e]ven if the parties are fully informed of the rule and its 
effects, structuring their contracts to circumvent the rule entails 
wasteful transaction costs that a different rule could eliminate ... 
[an] efficient rule should minimize the transaction costs necessary 
for most parties to achieve their preferred outcomes”.31 
For example, large complex construction projects may 
require the individual negotiating and signing of hundreds of 
separate collateral warranties, which can be difficult, expensive 
and time consuming. If the privity rule was abolished and 
replaced by a general scheme of third party rights, there would be 
a reduced need for such collateral warranties. Third party rights 
could be provided for in the main contract, without the need to go 
through the lengthy process of negotiating and obtaining separate 
warranties. The rights of third parties would also be easier to 
ascertain and manage, as all the rights would be contained in one 
document and not across several different warranties.32 In recent 
years in England, standard form construction contracts such as 
that produced by the Joint Contracts Tribunal have started to 
make use of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999 by 
including “Third Party Rights Schedules” as “a means of avoiding 
a proliferation of separate warranties and other collateral 
agreements”.33 In its Report, the Law Reform Commission 
suggested that similar developments would be of benefit in the 
Irish context, and that many complex contractual arrangements 
_____________________________________________________ 
31 Trebilcock, “The Doctrine of Privity of Contract: Judicial Activism in the 
Supreme Court of Canada”, (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 269, 
271 – 272.  
32 See Report paras. 2.16 – 2.25.  
33 Joint Contracts Tribunal, Major Project Construction Contract Guide, 
(London; JCT, 2005), para. 122.  
 
2008]            Privity of Contract- The Benefits of Reform 153 
which are currently entered into could be simplified by the 
creation of a general exception to the privity rule.34  
One context in which the privity rule causes many 
difficulties is in relation to exemption clauses which seek to 
exclude or limit the contractual or tortious liability of a third 
party, such as an employee, sub-contractor, or agent of the 
contracting party.35 A strict application of the privity rule means 
that third parties would not be able to rely on such a clause, as 
they were not party to the contract in which it was contained.36 
Exceptions to this rule have been developed in the courts,37 which 
in some instances have been willing to allow third parties to rely 
on exemption clauses where to do so “is to give effect to the clear 
intentions of a commercial document”.38 However, this approach 
is still quite limited. For example, it must be shown that the 
contractor was acting as the third party’s agent in obtaining the 
limitation of liability.39 It has been argued that ensuring that this 
requirement is satisfied “imposes additional transaction costs and 
may present special difficulties where the subcontractors are not 
identified at the time the head contract is entered into and hence 
cannot be said to have authorized the head contractor to act on 
their behalf”.40 However, a more basic criticism of the failure to 
fully recognise and enforce exemption clauses which are intended 
to protect third parties is that to do so is to ignore the allocation of 
_____________________________________________________ 
34 Report, para. 2.14. 
35 See Report at paras. 2.35 – 2.45.  
36 See Adler v. Dickson [1955] 1 Q.B. 158.  
37 In Ireland, there is also possibly a legislative exception to the privity rule 
here. Section 34(1)(b) of the Civil Liability Act, 1961 provides that a defence 
“arising under a contract” is available in respect of a negligence action, but it is 
unclear whether this refers to a defence in any contract, or merely a contract to 
which the defendant is privy. See Quill, “Sub-contractors, Exclusion Clauses & 
Privity” (1991) I.L.T. 211. 
38 New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v. A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd, The 
Eurymedon [1975] A.C. 154, at 169, per Lord Wilberforce. See also Port 
Jackson Stevedoring v. Salmond & Spraggon (The New York Star) [1980] 3 All 
E.R. 257.  
39 See Scruttons Ltd v. Midland Silicones Ltd [1962] A.C. 446. 
40 Trebilcock, “The Doctrine of Privity of Contract: Judicial Activism in the 
Supreme Court of Canada”, (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 269, 
280. It is possible for the subcontractor to ratify the head contractor’s actions 
after the fact, but this may involve a further increase in transaction costs.  
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risks and obligations agreed upon by the contracting parties.41 
The problem has been summarised in the Supreme Court of 
Canada as follows: 
 
[A]n application of the [privity rule] so as to prevent a third 
party from relying on a limitation of liability clause which 
was intended to benefit him or her frustrates sound 
commercial practice and justice. It does not respect 
allocations and assumptions of risk made by the parties to 
the contract and it ignores the practical realities of insurance 
coverage. In essence, it permits one party to make a 
unilateral modification to the contract by circumventing its 
provisions and the express or implied intention of the parties. 
In addition, it is inconsistent with the reasonable 
expectations of all the parties to the transaction, including 
the third party beneficiary who is made to support the entire 
burden of liability.42 
 
Taking into account views such as these, the Law Reform 
Commission concluded:  
 
A contracting party who agrees to take on certain risks, or 
who has agreed that their rights to bring an action against a 
third party will be limited, should not be able to circumvent 
this agreement merely because it is the third party and not 
the contracting party who seeks to rely on it. To the extent 
that the law currently prevents third parties from relying on 
such clauses, it is clearly in need of reform.43 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
41 See Trebilcock, “The Doctrine of Privity of Contract: Judicial Activism in 
the Supreme Court of Canada”, (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 
269.  
42 London Drugs v. Kuehne & Nagel International Ltd [1992] 3 S.C.R. 299 at 
423, per Iacobucci J. See also Fraser River Pile & Dredge Ltd v. Can Dive 
Services Ltd [1999] 3 S.C.R. 108. 
43 Report, para. 2.45. See also paras. 3.15 – 3.18. It should be noted that this 
recommendation is subject to the normal rules on the incorporation and 
construction of exemption clauses, so that exemption clauses should still be 
subject to close judicial control and scrutiny. In particular, legislative measures 
such as the European Communities (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) 
Regulations, 1995 (S.I. No. 27 of 1995) would have to be taken into account: 
see Report, paras. 3.137 – 3.141.  
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The final argument put forward by the Commission in favour of 
reform was that the current law in Ireland does not reflect the 
international trend in favour of the enforcement of third party 
contractual rights. Third party rights have been long recognised in 
the United States44 and in civil law jurisdictions such as France45 
and Germany,46 and in recent years the privity rule has been 
significantly reformed in common law jurisdictions such as 
England and Wales,47 Singapore,48 New Zealand,49 Canada50 and 
Australia.51 Third party rights have been conceptualised 
differently in different jurisdictions, according to each 
jurisdiction’s legal framework and needs. It would thus not be 
possible to simply “transplant” the law on third party rights from 
another jurisdiction into our own. Rather, in reforming the privity 
rule, legislators in Ireland should benefit and learn from the 
experience in other jurisdictions, and choose carefully from the 
different schemes which exist elsewhere.  
_____________________________________________________ 
44 The law in the United States is reflected in s. 304 of the American Law 
Institute’s Second Restatement of Contracts, which states: “[a] promise in a 
contract creates a duty in the promisor to any intended beneficiary to perform 
the promise, and the intended beneficiary may enforce the duty”.  
See Lawrence v. Fox (1859) 20 N.Y. 268; Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA 
Services Inc (1979) 378 Mass. 535.  
45 See Article 1121 of the French Civil Code.  
46 See §328 - 333 of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch).  
47 See the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999, s. 1, which was 
enacted following the recommendations of the Law Commission in their 1996 
Report Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties (Law 
Com. No. 242, 1996).  
48 See the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 2001.  
49 See the Contracts (Privity) Act, 1982, which was enacted following the New 
Zealand Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Report on Privity 
of Contract (Wellington: Department of Justice, 1981).  
50 In Canada, s. 4 of the New Brunswick Law Reform Act, 1993 and Article 
1444 of the Quebec Civil Code provide for third party rights. There has also 
been a substantial amount of judicial reform of the privity rule: see Fraser 
River Pile & Dredge Ltd v. Can Dive Services Ltd. [1999] 3 S.C.R. 108. 
However, legislative reforms have still been advocated by the Law Reform 
Commission of Nova Scotia in its Final Report on Privity of Contract (Third 
Party Rights) (Halifax: Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia, 2004).  
51 See s. 11(2) of the Western Australia Property Law Act, 1969, s. 55 of the 
Queensland Property Law Act, 1974, and s. 56 of the Northern Territory Law 
of Property Act, 2000. 
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The models in England and Wales are of particular benefit 
in this context, as in both cases the privity rule was reformed by 
means of detailed legislation. In New Zealand, section 4 of the 
Contracts (Privity) Act, 1982 provides that:  
 
[W]here a promise contained in a deed or contract confers, 
or purports to confer, a benefit on a person, designated by 
name, description, or reference to a class, who is not a party 
to the deed or contract (whether or not the person is in 
existence at the time when the deed or contract is made), the 
promisor shall be under an obligation, enforceable at the suit 
of that person, to perform that promise. 
 
This is subject to the proviso that the section does not apply “to a 
promise which, on the proper construction of the deed or contract, 
is not intended to create, in respect of the benefit, an obligation 
enforceable at the suit of that person”.  
In England and Wales, section 1 of the Contracts (Rights of 
Third Parties) Act, 1999 provides that a third party can enforce a 
term of a contract if the contract “expressly provides that he may” 
or “if the term purports to confer a benefit on him”, although the 
latter situation is subject to the proviso that it does not apply if 
“on a proper construction of the contract it appears that the parties 
did not intend the term to be enforceable by the third party”.52 
The kind of term that a third party can enforce is said to include a 
term of a contract which excludes or limits the liability of the 
third party.53  
A further consideration for the Commission in this regard is 
the continuing work of the European Commission on the 
Common Frame of Reference of Contract Law. In 2003 the 
European Commission’s “Action Plan on A More Coherent 
European Contract Law” proposed the development of a 
Common Frame of Reference (CFR) which could be used by the 
Commission in reviewing existing legislation and drafting new 
legislation.54 In the 2004 “Way Forward” Paper the Commission 
suggested that the main purpose of the CFR would be to provide 
_____________________________________________________ 
52 Sections 1(1) and 1(2).  
53 Section 1(6).  
54 [2003] O.J. 63/1 COM [2003] final. 
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“fundamental principles, definitions and model rules” which 
could serve as a legislators’ guide or “tool box”.55 The first major 
publication to result from this project is the Draft Common Frame 
of Reference prepared by the Study Group on a European Civil 
Code and the Research Group on European Community Private 
Law (Acquis Group).56 Published shortly after the Law Reform 
Commission’s Report, it includes a section on the “effect of [a] 
stipulation in favour of a third party”57 which states that the 
parties to a contract “may, by the contract, confer a right or other 
benefit on a third party”58 and the benefit conferred “may take the 
form of an exclusion or limitation of the third party’s liability to 
one of the contracting parties”.59 Although currently the focus of 
the European Commission is now on aspects of the consumer 
acquis, as opposed to contract law more generally,60 the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference is important in that it reflects a 
consensus on the principles that underlie contract law in Europe. 
It is clear that the rights of third parties to enforce contracts made 
for their benefit is one of those principles, and yet Ireland lags 
behind the rest of Europe in its failure to recognise such a right.  
 
 
III. THE SCHEME PROPOSED BY THE LAW REFORM 
COMMISSION 
In its Report, the Law Reform Commission recommended 
that the privity rule should be reformed by means of detailed 
legislation. The scheme proposed by the Commission recognizes 
that there must be limits to when and how a contract can be 
enforced by a third party – contracting parties should not be liable 
to an indeterminate number of third parties merely because the 
contract incidentally benefits them. The most important limitation 
_____________________________________________________ 
55 European Contract Law and the revision of the acquis: The Way Forward 
COM [2004] 651 final.  
56 Von Bar, Clive, Schulte-Nolke (eds.), Principles, Definitions and Model 
Rules of European Private Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), 
Interim Outline Edition (Munich: Sellier, 2008).  
57 Book II, ch. 9, s. 3.  
58 Book II, 9:301(1).  
59 Book II, 3:301(1). 
60 See the European Commission’s Second Progress Report on the Common 
Frame of Reference, COM [2007] 447 final. 
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on the rights of third parties to sue is that a third party does not 
have a right to enforce a contract, or a term of a contract, if the 
contracting parties did not intend for them to have this right. Even 
if a third party has a right of enforcement, it is clear that this is to 
be subject to the terms and conditions of the contract itself.61 
Thus, the intention of the contracting parties is paramount.  
The corollary of this is that the proposed legislation is optional, 
and contracting parties can exclude it if they wish.62 
Taking the principle of the autonomy of the contracting 
parties as its starting point, the Commission’s proposed statutory 
scheme deals with issues such as when third parties can enforce 
their rights under a contract, the identification of the third party, 
the ability of the contracting parties to cancel or vary the contract, 
the defences available to the promisor, the remedies available to 
the third party, and the possibility of overlapping claims.  
The Commission also discussed whether existing exceptions to 
the privity rule should be retained, and whether certain types of 
contracts should be exempted from the proposed legislation.  
 
A. When Should a Third Party be able to Enforce their Rights 
under a Contract? 
The Commission recommended that third parties should be 
able to enforce a term of a contract in three different situations.63  
First, the Commission recommended that a third party should be 
able to enforce a term of the contract when the term expressly 
benefits the third party, provided it was the intention of the 
contracting parties that the third party should be able to enforce 
this term. In other words, once the contract expressly confers a 
benefit on a third party, a presumption arises that the parties 
intended for the third party to have a right of action to enforce this 
term. This presumption can be rebutted by the contracting parties 
_____________________________________________________ 
61 See Report, paras. 3.46 – 3.49, and Draft Bill, s. 3(7). 
62 See Report, paras. 3.152 – 3.153, and Draft Bill, s. 9(8). The mere failure to 
exclude the operation of proposed legislation will not guarantee that a third 
party has a right to enforce the contract.  
63 Report, paras. 3.02 – 3.19. For the sake of clarity, the Commission 
recommended that, provided all other requirements were met, the fact that a 
third party has not provided any consideration for the contracting party’s 
promise should not be an obstacle to their right to enforce the contract: Report, 
para. 3.27, and Draft Bill s. 3(6).  
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(or rather, the promisor64) if they can show that they did not 
intend for the third party to have such a right. Second, the 
Commission recommended that a third party should be able to 
enforce a term of the contract when the contract expressly states 
that the third party has a right of enforcement, regardless of 
whether or not the contract benefits the third party. Third, the 
Commission recommended that a third party should have a right 
to rely on a term of a contract which excludes or limits the 
liability of the third party, provided that was the intention of the 
parties.  
The Draft Bill makes an important distinction between 
express and implied benefits. When a contract expressly benefits 
the third party, there is a presumption that the contracting parties 
intended for the third party to have a right of enforcement. 
However, if the contract impliedly benefits a third party, there is 
no such presumption, and the third party has no rights unless the 
contract expressly gives that third party a right to enforce the 
contract. This creates certainty for, and protects, contracting 
parties, in that third parties cannot enforce contracts which only 
incidentally benefit them unless the contract expressly states that 
they may do so.  
The Draft Bill provides that when ascertaining the 
intentions of the parties the court should interpret the contract “in 
light of the surrounding circumstances which are reasonably 
available to the third party”.65 This is an important addition to the 
Draft Bill, which will hopefully avoid some of the confusion 
which has been caused by a lack of similar clarification in the 
English Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999. In its 1996 
Report, the Law Commission for England and Wales favoured an 
approach whereby the courts would take into account the 
surrounding circumstances,66 but this was not expressly provided 
for in the 1999 Act, and it was argued that the Act restricts the 
courts to the contract itself when establishing the intentions of the 
_____________________________________________________ 
64 The Commission makes clear that the defendant to any action will generally 
be the promisor, i.e. the contracting party who promised to benefit the third 
party. See Report, para. 3.50.  
65 Draft Bill, s. 3(2).  
66 Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties (Law Com. 
No. 242, 1996) at para. 7.18.  
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parties.67 The English Court of Appeal has recently confirmed, 
however, that the courts should, in an appropriate case, take into 
account all the surrounding circumstances,68 although it is unclear 
whether or not there is a requirement that these surrounding 
circumstances be readily available to the third party.69  
The approach taken by the Law Reform Commission in the Draft 
Bill would seem to be a sensible one, which enhances certainty 
while balancing the interests of the contracting parties and the 
third party.   
 
B. Identification of a Third Party Beneficiary 
It is clearly important that the third party beneficiaries of 
contracts be easily identifiable, and thus the Commission 
recommended that the third party must be expressly identified.70 
However, the Commission recognised that a requirement that a 
third party beneficiary be individually named in the contract 
could be overly restrictive. For example, the contracting parties 
may want to benefit multiple third parties who are part of a 
particular group or class, such as all the employees of a company. 
Naming each individual third party would be cumbersome and 
commercially inconvenient in such a situation. The Commission 
thus recommended that it should be possible to identify the third 
party either by name or by description, and that this description 
_____________________________________________________ 
67 Roe, “Contractual Intention under section 1(1)(b) and 1(2) of the Contracts 
(Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999”, (2000) 65 M.L.R. 887. 
68 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v. Ayres [2008] E.W.C.A. Civ 52; [2008] All 
E.R. (D) 90 (Feb), reversing the decision of Lindsay J. in the High Court at 
[2007] E.W.H.C. 775 (Ch), [2007] All E.R. (D) 43.  
69 In Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v. Ayres the surrounding circumstances were 
reasonably available to the third party, so the issue of what was to happen if 
they were not so available did not arise. In Investors Compensation Scheme 
Ltd v. West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 W.L.R. 896 Lord Hoffman 
stated that the background which may be taken into account when interpreting 
a contract includes “absolutely anything which would have affected the way in 
which the language of the document would have been understood by a 
reasonable man” but that this was subject to “the requirement that it should 
have been reasonably available to the parties”: [1998] 1 W.L.R. 896, at 912.  
It is unclear however whether or not this includes third parties. See also the 
views of Saville L.J. in Saville National Bank of Sharjah v. Dellborg (Court of 
Appeal, unreported, Saville L.J., 9 July 1997). 
70 Draft Bill, s. 3(4).  
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should include being a member of a class or group of persons.71 
The Commission also recognised that the contracting parties may 
wish to benefit third parties who are not yet in existence, for 
example, all the future employees of a company, or children who 
are not yet born, or persons who enter into sub-contracts in the 
future with one contracting party. The Commission saw no reason 
why such third parties should be excluded from the remit of the 
legislation, once it was possible to identify them with sufficient 
certainty, and thus recommended that there should be no 
requirement that the third party be in existence at the time of 
formation of the contract.72 
 
C. The Right of the Contracting Parties to Vary or Cancel the 
Contract 
In determining the right of the contracting parties to 
mutually agree to vary or cancel the contract, the Commission 
had to compromise between two sets of competing interests. If the 
contracting parties had an unlimited power to vary the contract, 
the third party’s rights would be relatively meaningless, as these 
rights could be changed by the mutual agreement of the 
contracting parties at any time. However, if the contracting parties 
could never agree to vary the terms of the contract it could restrict 
the contracting parties’ ability to renegotiate and deal with 
problems as they arise over the course of performance.  
In particular, problems could arise where the third party’s rights 
are a minor aspect of a complex contract, but the contracting 
parties’ inability to vary those terms concerning the third party 
means that the main provisions of the contract cannot be changed.  
In many jurisdictions where third party rights are 
recognised, the contracting parties are free to vary or cancel the 
terms of the contract until a certain determinable point.  After this 
point, they may not vary or terminate the contract without the 
consent of the third party. This point, when the third party rights 
are said to have “crystallised”, may occur when the contract is 
formed;73 when the third party accepts the contract;74 when the 
_____________________________________________________ 
71 Report, para. 3.23 and Draft Bill, s. 3(4).  
72 See Report, para. 3.24, and Draft Bill, s. 3(5).  
73 This is the case in Scotland, where third parties can enforce contractual 
rights on the basis of a ius quaesitum tertio. See MacQueen, “Third Party 
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third party “adopts” the contract;75 or when the third party relies 
on or materially alters their position in reliance on the contract.76 
In England and Wales the contracting parties lose the right to vary 
the contract if the third party communicates assent to the term to 
the promisor, or if the promisor is aware that the third party has 
relied on the term, or if the promisor can reasonably be expected 
to have foreseen that the third party would rely on the term and 
the third party has in fact relied upon it.77 The sheer variety of 
solutions to this problem shows that the issue is far from simple, 
and that many different approaches could be taken.  
The Commission concluded that the contracting parties 
should not be able to cancel or vary the contract once it has been 
assented to, either by word or conduct, by the third party and 
either contracting party is aware of this fact.78 If the consent of 
the third party is not obtained, the variation or cancellation of the 
contract will not affect the rights of the third party, who may 
bring an action based on the terms of the contract which existed 
before the variation.79 In taking this approach, the Commission 
opted for simplicity and certainty over the interests of the 
contracting parties, and it is one of the few places in the Report 
where the rights of the third party could be said to “trump” those 
of the contracting parties. However, the rights of contracting 
                                                                                                           
Rights in Contract: English Reform and Scottish Concerns”, (1997) 1 
Edinburgh Law Review 488, pp. 489 – 490.  
74 See the Northern Territory Law of Property Act, 2000, s. 56(2). 
75 See the Western Australia Property Law Act, 1969, s. 11(3). 
76 See the New Zealand Contracts (Privity) Act, 1982, s. 5(1), and s. 311 of the 
American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 
77 The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999, s. 2(1).  
78 Report, paras. 3.33 and 3.41, and Draft Bill, ss. 4(1) and 4(2). The term 
“assent” is preferable to “acceptance”, as the latter tends to imply a 
requirement of communication. There is no requirement that the third party 
communicate acceptance, but rather the test is based on the awareness of the 
contracting parties. This is to prevent a situation where the contracting parties 
are aware that the third party has assented to the arrangement (for example, the 
third party may have been present at the time the contract was agreed upon) but 
the promisor seeks to rely on the fact that the third party never formally 
communicated acceptance of the agreement. Of course, communication of 
acceptance is one way of ensuring that the contracting parties are aware of the 
third party’s assent.  
79 Report, paras. 3.36 and 3.41. 
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parties are wider than would initially appear, by virtue of the fact 
that they remain free to include in their contract an express term 
allowing them to vary or terminate the rights of the third party 
under the contract. The Commission pointed out that this would 
reduce the rights of the third party, but that this “should remain 
the choice of the contracting parties who are, of course, free not 
to contract or to benefit the third party at all”.80  
As an added protection for the contracting parties, the 
proposed legislation provides that the courts should have the 
discretion to authorise a variation or cancellation of the contract, 
on such terms as seem appropriate, where the third party’s 
consent cannot be obtained because their whereabouts cannot 
reasonably be ascertained or because they lack the mental 
capacity to give assent.81 In this situation the court can impose 
such conditions as it sees fit, including a condition requiring the 
payment of compensation to the third party.82 
 
D. The Defences Available to the Promisor 
To avoid a situation where the third party is placed in a 
better position than the contracting parties, and to protect the 
position of the promisor, the Commission recommended that the 
promisor should be entitled to avail of any defence that would 
have been available if the promisee had taken the action, provided 
it arises out of or in connection with the contract in which the 
promise is contained.83 For example, the promisor may be able to 
rely on the undue influence or misrepresentation of the promisee, 
or on a failure of performance or breach by the promisee. 
Importantly, the defences available to the promisor include the 
right to set-off, against the claim of the third party, any claim the 
promisor has against the promisee. However, the promisor’s 
claim cannot exceed the amount claimed by the third party, and, 
_____________________________________________________ 
80 Report, paras. 3.37, 3.42 and Draft Bill, s. 4(3).  
81 Report, paras. 3.38, 3.43 and Draft Bill, s. 4(4). The provision in s. 4(5) of 
the Draft Bill, whereby the court may dispense with consent required if it 
“cannot reasonably be ascertained whether or not the third party has in fact 
assented to the term” would seem to be superfluous in light of the fact that the 
contracting parties can vary the rights of the third parties if they are unaware 
whether or not the term was assented to.  
82 Draft Bill, s. 4(6).  
83 Report, paras. 3.52, 3.59 and Draft Bill, s. 5(2).  
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as is the case with other defences, must arise out of or in 
connection with the contract.84 There is of course potential for 
injustice in a situation where the third party is unaware of the 
conduct giving rise to the defence, but the Commission reasoned 
that “where two relatively innocent parties are affected by the 
improper conduct of the promisee, the right of the promisor to 
avail of the defence should prevail over the right of the third 
party”.85  
In addition, the Commission recognised that in certain 
situations it could be important to take the conduct of the third 
party into account. For example, the promisor may have entered 
into the contract because of the undue influence of the third party, 
rather than the undue influence of the promisee. Thus, the 
Commission recommended that the rights of the third party 
should also be subject to any defence which would have been 
available if the third party had been a party to the contract.86 
Similarly, the Commission reasoned that the promisor should be 
free to counterclaim against the third party, where the promisor 
would in any event have had a right of action against the third 
party. The Commission stressed that this is not imposing any 
additional burdens on the third party, as any such action could 
have been taken in any event.87  
 
E. The Remedies Available to the Third Party 
One of the criticisms the Commission had of the privity 
rule was that it could cause an injustice to a third party who 
reasonably expected the contract to be performed. This injustice 
was said to be “particularly clear” where the third party had relied 
on the contract to their detriment, but it could also be seen 
“simply where the third party has a reasonable expectation that a 
contract, or term of a contract, made for its benefit, would be 
_____________________________________________________ 
84 Report, para. 3.57, and Draft Bill, s. 5(2). The Draft Bill should perhaps 
clarify here that the promisor’s right to set off cannot exceed the amount 
claimed by the third party.  
85 Report, para. 3.53.  
86 Report, paras. 3.55, 3.60 and Draft Bill, s. 5(3).  
87 Report, para. 3.58. Throughout the Report, the Commission is clear that 
these reforms are not intended to impose burdens on third parties. See in 
particular paras. 3.46 – 3.49.  
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enforced”.88 The proposed reforms thus aim to protect the third 
party’s expectation interest, and not merely their reliance 
interest.89 In practical terms, this means that a third party who 
brings an action for breach of contract is entitled to a full range of 
remedies, including damages to compensate their expectation 
interest and specific performance, subject to the normal rules 
governing such remedies.90  
The remedy of the third party is not limited to 
compensation for loss incurred in reliance on the promise 
contained in the contract, and is not contingent on the third party 
having relied on the contract in any way.91 Although the 
possibility of linking the remedy available to a third party to its 
reliance loss may initially seem attractive, particularly as a means 
of reflecting the fact that a third party has not provided any 
valuable consideration for the promise contained in the contract,92 
such a limitation could cause the creation of a “two tier” system 
of third party rights, whereby third parties who can rely on an 
existing exception to the rule (for example, section 8 of the 
Married Women’s Status Act, 1957) could claim full damages, 
while third parties who have to rely on the proposed legislation 
could only claim damages reflecting the extent of their reliance 
on the contract. Such a system would increase the complexity of 
litigation and cause much uncertainty.  
 
F. Overlapping Claims 
Under the proposed scheme, the rights of the promisee and 
the third party to enforce the contract are independent of each 
other, and neither has priority of action over the other.93  
The promisee does not have to wait for the third party to refuse 
the opportunity to sue before they can bring an action, and vice 
versa. Nor is there any requirement that the promisee be joined as 
a party to the litigation when a third party sues to enforce the 
contract (or vice versa), but the Commission recommended that 
_____________________________________________________ 
88 Report, para. 2.07.  
89 Report, para. 2.94.  
90 See Report, paras. 3.63 – 3.68, and Draft Bill, s. 3(8).  
91 See Report, para. 3.32, footnotes 31 and 32.  
92 See Report, para. 3.27, and Draft Bill, s. 3(6).  
93 Report, paras. 3.71, 3.76, and Draft Bill, s. 6. 
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this should be possible in an appropriate case.94 However, to 
avoid the risk that a promisor could face double liability, once a 
promisor has fulfilled their duty to the third party, either wholly 
or partly, the promisor should to that extent be discharged from 
their duty to the promisee.95 Similarly, if a situation arises in 
which a promisor is liable to pay substantial damages to a 
promisee for breach of its promise to benefit the third party,96 the 
court should reduce any award to the third party to take account 
of the sum recovered by the promisee.97  
 
_____________________________________________________ 
94 Report, paras. 3.71 and 3.76.  
95 Report, para. 3.72, 3.78, and Draft Bill, s. 7(1).  
96 As discussed above, the promisee may not be able to show that they have 
recovered a loss, and may not be able to recover substantial damages 
representing the loss suffered by a third party. Furthermore, the Albazero 
exception only applies if the party who has suffered the loss (i.e. the third 
party) has no legal claim against the contract breaker, which is not the case 
under the proposed reforms.  
97 Report, paras. 3.75, 3.79, and Draft Bill, s. 7(2). 
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G. Existing Exceptions 
As discussed above, the harshness of the privity rule is 
mitigated somewhat by multiple common law and legislative 
exceptions. Unsurprisingly, the Commission recognised that the 
reforms proposed would not be an adequate or suitable substitute 
for these exceptions, some of which, for example, the law of 
agency, trusts and tort law, are separate areas of law in their own 
right and not merely a means of avoiding the privity rule. Some of 
the existing exceptions could give third parties more secure rights 
than those in the proposed legislation, and it would be somewhat 
bizarre if a measure designed (in part) to improve the rights of 
third parties could in fact reduce the current protection available 
to them. The Commission thus recommended that the existing 
exceptions should be retained.98 Commenting on the equivalent 
provision of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999, 
Treitel has said that the retention of the existing exceptions leaves 
the law in an overly complex state, as a third party who cannot 
claim under the Act could still rely on an existing common law or 
statutory exception.99  
However, although it cannot be denied that the creation of a 
further avenue for a third party to enforce contracts may lengthen 
the discussion of privity in the average text book on contract law, 
in many ways the law on the topic will become more certain.  
One of the criticisms the Commission has of the current law is 
that it is uncertain – it is difficult for contracting parties and third 
parties to say with any certainty whether or not the third party has 
a right to enforce the contract. To a large extent this uncertainty 
exists because there is always the possibility that a court, in its 
eagerness to avoid the harshness of the privity rule, may find that 
an exception to the rule exists based on an “artificial and forced 
use”100 of an existing concept such as trusts or estoppel.  
In contrast, if the proposed scheme is enacted, the judiciary is 
_____________________________________________________ 
98 See Report, paras. 3.80 – 3.88, and Draft Bill, s. 9(5).  
99 Treitel, The Law of Contract, 11th ed., (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003), p. 
581.  
100 The Law Commission for England and Wales has pointed out that some of 
the exceptions to the rule have developed through the “somewhat artificial and 
forced use of existing concepts”: Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit 
of Third Parties (Law Com. No. 242, 1996) para. 12.1. 
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“unlikely to carve out a doctrine of third party rights which will 
operate in parallel to the statutory scheme”.101 Given the relative 
ease with which third party rights can be conferred under the 
proposed legislation, the failure of the contracting parties to make 
use of that legislation will generally be a clear indication that they 
did not intend for a third party to have any rights of enforcement. 
The introduction of a legislative scheme of third party rights 
should thus reduce reliance on concepts such as trusts, and the 
law should become clearer as a result.  
 
H. Excluded Contracts 
Certain categories of contract are excluded from the ambit 
of the scheme. Certain contracts are excluded on policy grounds. 
For example, the proposed legislation is not intended to give any 
third party a right to enforce any contract of employment against 
an employee.102 A similar exclusion can be seen in section 6 of 
the English Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999, which 
was proposed after government fears that employees could 
become liable in contract to third parties in the case of losses 
caused by strikes or industrial disputes.103 This exclusion does not 
prevent third parties from bringing an action against the employer 
where the employer has promised to benefit them; nor does it 
prevent third party employees from enforcing terms of contracts 
which benefit them.  
Other types of contracts are excluded because the creation 
of additional third party rights would undermine existing rules 
and regimes. For example, the proposed legislation does not apply 
to the contract formed between a company and its shareholders, 
and between individual shareholders, under section 25 of the 
Companies Act, 1963.104 Nor does it apply where the third party 
_____________________________________________________ 
101 Andrews, “Strangers to Justice No Longer: The Reversal of the Privity Rule 
under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999”, [2001] C.L.J. 353, 
379. See also MacMillan, “A Birthday Present for Lord Denning: The 
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999”, (2000) 63 M.L.R. 721, pp. 730-
731. 
102 Report, paras. 3.90 – 3.92, and Draft Bill, s. 9(3).  
103 See Merkin, “Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999”, in Merkin 
(ed.), Privity of contract: The Impact of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) 
Act, 1999 (London: LLP Professional Publishing, 2000), p. 134.  
104 Report, paras. 3.93, 3.98, and Draft Bill, s. 9(2).  
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is a company which has not yet been incorporated.105 Aware of 
the review being carried by the Company Law Review Group and 
the Department of Enterprise Trade and Employment, the 
Commission errs on the side of caution in refusing to let specific 
rules be affected by a general reform of contract law, preferring 
instead that any such review occur as part of a general reform of 
company law.  
Similarly, the Commission recommended the exclusion of 
negotiable instruments, as these are already governed by the Bills 
of Exchange Act, 1882,106 and the exclusion of letters of credit, 
which are subject to their own regime which reflects international 
commercial practice.107  
Finally, the Commission recommended the exclusion of 
contracts for the international carriage of goods by air, rail and 
road, as such contracts are already governed by international 
agreements which could be undermined by the creation of 
additional third party rights,108 and the exclusion of contracts for 
the carriage of goods by sea, as these are governed by the Bills of 
Lading Act, 1855.109 With regard to the latter type of contract, the 
Commission recognised the need to reform this Act, in much the 
same manner as was done in the United Kingdom with the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1992, but concluded, perhaps 
optimistically, that this should be done by means of a specific 
review of the law relating to the carriage of goods by sea, and not 
by means of a general reform of the privity rule.110  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Before the introduction of reforms in England, Lord 
Diplock described the privity rule as “an anachronistic short-
coming that has for many years been regarded as a reproach to 
_____________________________________________________ 
105 Report, paras. 3.94 – 3.98, and Draft Bill, s. 9(2).  
106 Report, paras. 3.112 – 3.113, and Draft Bill, s. 9(1)(a).  
107 Report, paras. 3.114 – 3.115, and Draft Bill, s. 9(1)(b).  
108 Report, paras. 3.99 – 3.104, and Draft Bill, s. 9(4)(b).  
109 Report, paras. 3.105 – 3.111, and Draft Bill, s. 9(4)(a). A third party can 
however enforce an exclusion or limitation clause in such a contract if the 
other requirements of the Act are met.  
110 For criticism of the current law in Ireland, see White, Commercial Law 
(Dublin: Thompson Round Hall, 2002), pp. 644 – 645.  
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_____________________________________________________ 
[the] law”.111 In its Report, the Law Reform Commission’s 
Report agrees that there is a need to reform the doctrine, and the 
Draft Bill sets out in detail the means of doing so. It is to be 
hoped now that heed will be paid to the recommendations in the 
Report, and that legislation will be forthcoming. Contract law in 
Ireland will be more logical, certain, fair and commercially 
convenient, and more in line with the law in most other 
jurisdictions, as a result of any such move.  
 
 
111 Swain v. The Law Society [1983] 1 A.C. 598 at 611.  
